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Background: Donald T. Campbell, a scientist, humanist, 
and generalist, left an indelible mark on the evaluation 
discipline through his methodological work. He is less 
well known within the evaluation community for his 
landmark contributions to biology and philosophy. Yet, 
the evolutionary epistemology that he pioneered has 
significant implications for evaluation.   
 
Purpose: This article examines the relevance of Donald 
T. Campbell’s blind variation and natural selection 
approach to evaluation theory, including an elucidation 
of its basic logic, its social remit as a discipline and 
trans-discipline, and its summative and formative 
functions. It also sketches in broad strokes the 
implications of evolutionary thinking for evaluation 
practice, including natural and artificial selection, 
ontogeny, phylogeny, co-evolution, and feedback. 
Finally, it comments on Campbell’s Experimenting 
Society vision and  the ongoing craze for randomised 
evaluations in development through an evolutionary 
lens. 
 
Setting: Not applicable. 
 
Intervention: Not applicable. 
 
Research Design:  Not applicable. 
 
Data Collection and Analysis: Not applicable. 
 
Findings: Not applicable. 
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Donald T. Campbell’s prominent place in the 
pantheon of the evaluation profession is 
secure. Within the evaluation community, he 
is best known for his exploration of evaluation 
biases, validity concepts, and experimental 
methods (Shadish and Cook, 1998). His 
utopian vision of an Experimenting Society 
(Campbell, 1971) adds to his notoriety and 
further underlines his life-long commitment to 
rigorous evaluation.  
Thus, perceptions are widespread that 
Campbell’s intellectual fame rests mostly on 
the design and use improved social research 
tools.  This explains why Alkin and Christie 
(2004) positioned Campbell squarely on the 
methods branch of their evaluation theory 
tree. Yet, as stressed by Shadish and Luellen 
(2004), Campbell’s evaluation legacy cannot 
be reduced to his (admittedly pioneering) 
methodological achievements. To the contrary, 
his polymathic life work cannot be pigeon 
holed since his writings consistently link 
methods, values, and use.  
It would be foolhardy to attempt a 
comprehensive catalogue or a critical 
appraisal of Campbell’s wide-ranging 
contributions to social research and 
evaluation within the scope of a journal article. 
In what follows, I only mean to show that 
Campbell’s epistemological thinking provides 
a coherent framework for appreciating 
evaluation’s role in society and for identifying 
new avenues of evaluative inquiry. I also hope 
to stimulate interest in evolution theory 
among evaluation practitioners. 
The article is structured as follows: First, I 
introduce Campbell as an inveterate 
trespasser across social science disciplines; 
Second, I outline the strands of his 
evolutionary epistemology; Third, I apply his 
evolutionary concepts to evaluation theory 
(“who we are”); Fourth, I do the same for 
evaluation practice; Fifth and finally, I look at 
the recent emergence of experimentalism in 






The Accidental Evaluator 
 
Campbell joined the program evaluation 
community fortuitously following the 
imprimatur of his experimentalist stance by 
Edward Suchman (1967), a notorious 
advocate of social research conducted in 
‘scientific’ ways. Suchman’s influential 
sponsorship helps explain why Campbell has 
long been perceived as an unequivocal 
champion of quantitative methods. Yet, his 
advocacy of social research experimentalism 
was always restrained and nuanced.  
Campbell never forsook the ambition to get 
evaluation practice aligned with scientific 
research strictures. But he fully recognized 
that the unruly vagaries of human interaction 
limit the utility of randomized social 
experiments. Accordingly, he helped to stock 
the evaluator’s toolkit with a variety of quasi-
experimental instruments (Trochim, 1998). He 
also took pains to advocate the pursuit of 
convergent validity through the triangulation 
of multiple methodologies.  
In his own words, “the polarity of 
quantitative vs. qualitative approaches to 
research on social action remains unresolved, 
if resolution were to mean a predominant 
justification of one over the other. Each pole is 
at its best in its criticisms of the other, not in 
invulnerability of its own claims to descriptive 
knowledge...If we are to be truly scientific we 
must re-establish the qualitative grounding of 
the quantitative.” (Campbell and Stanley, 
1974, pp. 29-30).  
No wonder then that, according to remarks 
made at an evaluation conference in 1992 –as 
reported by Chelimsky and Shadish (1997) – 
Campbell “consistently tried to integrate 
opposite poles in evaluation thinking, to bridge 
the gaps between them. This effort of his was 
crucial to evaluation survival … when it was 
under attack”. From this perspective, 
Campbell’s distinctive contribution to 
evaluation has as much to do with evaluation 
theory (‘who we are’) as with instrumental 
evaluation practices. Arguably, the immense 
debt evaluators owe Campbell is emblematic of 
a bold, comprehensive, and multi-disciplinary 
approach. 
As a research psychologist (he secured his 
PhD in psychology at Berkeley in 1947), 
Campbell’s early work anticipated recent 
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developments in behavioural psychology. He 
probed the conflicting misconceptions that 
underlie group biases (ethnic, racial, national, 
etc.)  and he proposed ways to help overcome 
interviewers’ and questionnaire biases 
(Campbell, 1950 and Campbell and Mohr, 
1950). Next, he put his undergraduate 
exposure to biology, genetics, anthropology, 
and sociology to work. His first faculty 
positions were at Ohio State University (1947-
1950) and the University of Chicago (1950-
1953) but it is at Northwestern University 
which had long promoted ‘no holds barred’ 
intellectual debate and fulsome interaction 
across disciplines that he found his 
intellectual home.   
This is where he spent 26 years, trained 
several generations of doctoral students, and 
made his mark in the field of social psychology 
through teaching and research. This is also 
where he initiated his fruitful inquiry about 
how knowledge is acquired, recognized, used, 
and transmitted, starting with the study of 
how false knowledge can be identified and set 
aside. Towards the discovery of ‘a science of 
science’, he undertook a bewildering range of 
scholarly endeavours so that when he took up 
his last academic post, at Lehigh University in 
1982, he was designated "university professor" 
with faculty listings in four departments: 





Just as Quine (1969), Campbell stressed the 
futility of seeking an understanding of 
knowledge ‘in itself’, i.e., to philosophize about 
science without resort to science. Instead, he 
favoured the study of how knowledge is 
processed using the natural sciences, 
including biology as well as the social sciences 
starting with psychology. For Campbell (1988) 
all knowledge is fallible and partial, but the 
external world exists independently of the 
mind, does not need to be proven, and 
provides the ultimate benchmark against 
which theories are falsified or temporarily 
retained.  
Thus, inspired by Karl Popper, Campbell 
(1974) coined the ‘evolutionary epistemology’ 
term to relate the processes of knowledge 
acquisition and growth to theories of biological 
evolution (especially of Darwinian evolution 
through natural selection). As he embarked on 
his intellectual journey at the frontiers of 
social research, Campbell (1990) applied 
“selection theory to trial and error learning… 
to visual perception… and to creative 
thought”. It is primarily through this lens that 
I propose to examine Campbell’s enduring 
impact on the evaluation discipline. 
First, Campbell posited that cognitive 
mechanisms in animals and humans are 
products of progressive biological adaptation. 
Thus, sensory mechanisms, the nervous 
system, the brain, etc. had gradually evolved 
to facilitate a proper fit with the external 
environment and ensure species survival. The 
acquisition of hearing and/or touch helped to 
detect obstacles and to improve trial and error 
movements. Vision eliminated the need for 
blind trial and error locomotion. Memory 
improved on the strict randomness and 
inefficiency of food search. Through the 
combination of sight and memory, beneficial 
survival habits emerged and eventually turned 
into instincts.  
Next, the advent of visually supported 
thought facilitated problem solving towards 
improved probabilities of survival.  Through 
socially vicarious mechanisms (i.e. 
observational learning and imitation), trial and 
error exploration by one member of the group 
benefited the entire group. Language (created 
and acquired through trial and error just as 
the other attributes) facilitated vicarious 
learning thus enhancing the chances of group 
survival. Finally, human knowledge was 
acquired through testing of expectations, 
hypotheses, or theories using the same 
variation and selective retention mechanisms 
that governed the prior phases of biological 
evolution.  
Peter Munz (2001), another epistemologist, 
went further in articulating Campbell’s 
selective adaptation vision by equating all 
organisms to embodied theories about their 
environment and by viewing all theories as 
disembodied organisms. Conversely, he 
conceived of the environment as a selection 
process operating through elimination of the 
“unfit”. Defining any organism as a 
provisionally true hypothesis about its 
operating environment that survives until it is 
falsified, he envisaged environmental studies 
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focused on the examination of surviving 
organisms.  
Thus, just as Munz, Campbell viewed 
biological evolution as a knowledge process. 
Hence, he applied the natural selection 
paradigm to learning, thought, and science. 
From this vantage point, he observed that as 
cultures and technologies evolve, weak 
theories tend to be discarded through 
falsification. Thus, scientific progress occurs 
as new and more promising conjectures are 
put forward, i.e., a theory prevails until it is 
replaced: the analogy with biological evolution 
holds. Furthermore, just as selection explains 
evolution, the selection process itself complies 
with a selection process: it is a multiple loop 
learning mechanism.  
In the same vein, Stephen Toulmin (1972), 
related knowledge creation to natural 
selection: ideas and concepts are introduced 
into the gene pool of scientific knowledge 
through journals, conferences, books etc. 
Assuming a reasonably free market for ideas, 
competition among scholars winnows out the 
field and only the more promising theories 
survive. Thus, in the knowledge world, trading 
and recombination of ideas mimic the 
biological evolution process.   
This assumes of course that the relative 
values of competing theories can be 
established and, especially in the social 
sphere, that political forces or cultural biases 
do not intervene to distort the outcome. They 
often do, of course, so that progress is not 
foreordained and when it takes place it is by 
fits and starts. This obstacle to social learning 
was one of Campbell’s persistent 
preoccupations as he aspired to turn open 
societies into experimenting societies through 
greater resort to eliminative induction, shared 
inquiry and the systematic use of trial and 
error mechanisms. 
 
Implications for Evaluation Theory 
 
Popper (1974) used the following metaphor to 
illustrate Campbell’s blind variation/selective 
retention model of knowledge creation: “… 
although the blind man who searches for a 
black hat may bring some order into his trials, 
the order is not given to him; he may choose 
or invent one order (method) first, and a 
different order later; and these choices will be 
trials too – even though on a higher level…the 
trials are forays into the unknown… they are 
blind; while to the degree that past knowledge 
enters, their blindness is only relative… We 
may at the beginning of an exploration be 
blinder than we are after even a short time, 
though after even a short time we may still be 
blind: we may still not know where the black 
hat is, but we may know (or think that we 
know) where it is not”   
Evidently, the blind man could do with 
some help – just as the hard-pressed policy 
maker in pursuit of effective solutions to a 
social problem does. In the social world, even 
more than in the natural world, uncertainty 
prevails, and prediction is foolhardy. Policy 
choices are often shots in the dark. Program 
design faces a wide range of options. 
Implementation brings forth new challenges 
and calls for frequent re-appraisals. Typically, 
responsible decision makers draw on a store 
of knowledge and/or an inventory of successes 
and failures to help chart their course, but this 
does not eliminate the possibility of error.  
Against this background, this section of 
the paper explains how Campbell’s variation 
and selection concepts help explain “who we 
are”; how evaluation builds bridges between 
Popper’s three Worlds; the rationale of 
evaluation as a discipline (and a trans-
discipline); the imperative of objectivity in 
evaluation; and the relevance of its 
overarching criteria to effective variation and 
selection. 
 
Blind Variation and Selective Retention 
 
In the natural world, biological traits that are 
maladaptive are shed while those that are 
adaptive are retained for an organism to 
survive and have healthy offspring. In the 
scientific and social world too, elimination of 
error facilitates judicious choices, and lays the 
groundwork for further knowledge advances.  
This is how social learning takes place and 
where cultural traditions find their 
justification. Thus, trial-and-error dominates 
progress in science and should do so as well 
in the policy world.  
This said, blind variation differs from 
random variation. In biology, variation is 
random given genetic mutations and re-
combinations.  In science and the social 
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domain, progress is made through systematic 
inquiry. If an experiment supports an 
intervention design, it weakens alternative 
designs. Conversely, a scientific or a program 
theory is apt to be chosen among many 
options if it best describes a phenomenon or 
appears promising. Over time, any theory 
acquires or loses credibility depending on the 
outcome of evaluative tests and on other 
inevitable changes in the body of knowledge 
surrounding it.  
Variation matters since only with diversity 
is knowledge likely to make competitive 
selection effective in setting aside unpromising 
designs and enhancing the survival prospects 
of selected interventions. Choice among policy 
options relies on prior experience and 
contextual (often vicarious) knowledge and 
social interventions are only undertaken if 
they promise to deliver results. This, as I will 
now try to demonstrate, is where evaluation 
(whether formal or informal, independent or 
self-administered) comes in. It distinguishes 
selective retention in the social knowledge 
world from natural selection in biology. 
 
Bridging the Natural and Human Worlds 
 
Karl Popper (1978) paints the following picture 
of our world:  
 
There is the physical universe, World 1, 
with its most important sub-universe, that 
of the living organisms. World 2, the world 
of conscious experience, emerges as an 
evolutionary product from the world of 
organisms. World 3, the world of the 
products of the human mind, emerges as 
an evolutionary product from World 2. In 
each of these cases, the emerging product 
has a tremendous feedback effect (pp. 166-
167).  
 
From this vantage point, and as part of his 
fulsome endorsement of Campbell’s 
evolutionary epistemology, Popper (1974, p. 
1060) stressed a singular characteristic of 
human knowledge: while animals as well as 
human beings focus on the physical world 
(World 1) and use their senses and their brains 
(World 2), only humans have evolved the 
capacity to create the knowledge products of 
World 3. 
According to Michael Scriven (2016), 
evaluation, a cognitive skill has an ancient 
pedigree that “pre-dates the emergence of true 
language” and that endowed humans with an 
enormous evolutionary advantage when 
“interwoven with demonstration, trial and 
differential reinforcement”. The Scriven 
conjecture asserts that the human species 
resorted to evaluation since its origins.  
 Irrespective of this proposition, it is self-
evident, as noted by Carol Weiss (1998, p. 3), 
that “people evaluate all the time”. But human 
bias is ubiquitous and mistakes in human 
judgment are the rule rather than the 
exception. This is amply confirmed by recent 
advances in behavioural psychology, the 
“science of error” pioneered by Nobel laureates 
Daniel Kahneman (2012) and Richard Thaler 
(2015). Pursuit of objectivity (Campbell’s 
lifelong crusade) is the fundamental rationale 
of evaluation as a discipline.   
 
Evaluation as a Discipline…and a Trans-
Discipline 
 
Popper’s World 2 is the domain of subjective 
knowledge and experience whereas World 3 is 
the realm of objective and collective (albeit 
transitional) knowledge created by the human 
mind.  The evaluation discipline is committed 
to fill gaps between World 2 and World 3. It is 
rooted in the proposition that intuition is 
fallible and needs control through systematic 
review, argumentation, and criticism.  
Specifically, evaluation as a discipline is 
mandated to improve the quality of 
information used for human decisions: 
evaluation reduces the scope of error and bias 
and adds a value dimension that other 
disciplines often lack. Evaluators are deeply 
invested in World 1 whereas social researchers 
often cut themselves from it within the ivory 
towers of World 3. The legitimation of claims 
implicit in any social intervention is at the 
centre of the evaluation discipline – as well as 
action research, its close cousin. It follows that 
meta-evaluation – the evaluation of evaluation 
– is a professional obligation of evaluators, as 
stressed by Stufflebeam (2001).    
To be sure, all knowledge occupations play 
a role in linking World 1 and World 3.  But the 
evaluation discipline is uniquely distinctive 
because: (i) it uses all the disciplines relevant 
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to the problem at hand; and (ii) it fulfils a 
unique trans-disciplinary function by 
providing other disciplines with tools that 
make them more effective, e.g. by “playing the 
role of arbitrator, scapegoat, trouble shooter, 
inventor, conscience, jury, or attorney” 
(Scriven, 1991, pp. 363-364).   
 As a result, evaluation generates a wide 
range of feedback loops among all three 
worlds. While it is governed by mental states 
and processes (World 2), it draws on the 
products of the human mind (World 3) to 
sharpen its assessment of the material 
environment (World 1). It also serves World 3 
by testing the interface between World 1 and 
3. Finally, at its cumulative best, it generates 
products for World 3. 
 
The Imperative of Objectivity 
 
Natural selection reflects different survival 
rates of organisms bearing adaptive genes 
whereas theory selection in science and choice 
of intervention in the social world are or 
should be performed with the help of 
specialists using legitimate, time tested 
protocols that identify designs that are close 
"fits" within a given context.  Thus, only a 
reliable mapping of the lay of the land and an 
accurate description of the missing headgear 
will help the blind man towards the right hat.  
It is the validity imperative in all its 
dimensions that underlies Campbell’s passion 
for research design on which he arguably “had 
a more profound effect in the second half of 
the twentieth century than any other single 
person” (Trochim, 1998, p. 407). For 
Campbell, objectivity does not imply analytic 
certainty, but it does justify the claim that a 
corrigible and fallible knowledge proposition is 
plausible.  
Specifically, validity implies that the theory 
of action selected for an intervention will 
survive construct validity tests that ascertain 
inter alia whether the samples of persons, 
settings, manipulations, and measures are 
adequate. Validity also means that evaluation 
findings are consistent with a theory of change 
that transparently links outputs and 
outcomes to impacts (conclusion validity).  
 Furthermore, observed outcomes should 
be attributable to the intervention (internal 
validity). Finally, external validity is the degree 
to which a causal relationship found in a study 
generalizes across various persons, settings, 
treatments, measures as well as cultures 
(Kirkhart, 2010). 
 
The Evolutionary Logic of Evaluation 
 
It should be clear by now that the evaluation 
function complies with the basic tenets of the 
evolutionary process evoked by Campbell. But 
is its basic logic consistent with evolutionary 
principles? According to Michael Scriven 
(1991, p. 139), evaluation is “the process of 
determining the merit, worth or value of 
something or the product of that process".  
Putting this definition to work readily 
demonstrates that the artificial selection 
process facilitated by evaluation is precisely 
designed to ascertain whether a social 
intervention organism fits its operating and 
authorizing environment.  
 Just as every relationship between an 
organism and its environment can be 
conceived a knowledge relation, every project, 
program, or policy (i.e. any social intervention) 
can be perceived as a theory that illuminates 
the intersection between the intervention and 
society. Thus, evaluation may either refute the 
theory, attest to its provisional fitness, or 
evoke the results of prior experiments to 
propose ways of tightening the fit between the 
intervention and its social environment.  
Evaluation bridges World 1 and World 3 by 
addressing the merit, worth and value trilogy.  
But fitness measured with one criterion does 
not guarantee fitness in terms of the other two. 
Merit is intrinsic to the intervention. Assessing 
merit means testing the theory embedded in 
the intervention conceived as an organism. Is 
the intervention designed to satisfy its own 
survival needs? Even if it is, i.e. even if the 
intervention meets its intended objectives, 
worth is not guaranteed. 
Worth is extrinsic to the intervention. It 
addresses another question: is the 
intervention equipped to survive external 
threats and to meet group expectations and 
needs? It is a highly pertinent question in 
evolutionary terms: an intervention that 
survives a merit oriented summative 
evaluation is still vulnerable. Just as a natural 
organism is vulnerable to predatory threats 
and ostracism from other group members, it is 
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not enough to satisfy the owners, managers 
and sponsors of an intervention and meet their 
short-term objectives.  
Specifically, inability to meet the demands 
of intervention stakeholders, especially those 
(funders, owners, voters, opinion makers, etc.) 
that constitute its authorizing environment 
can doom a social intervention (Moore and 
Khagram, 2004).  Equally, biological survival 
relies on mutual aid and group support: 
inadequate group cohesion and cooperation 
can lead to species extinction.  Mutual aid as 
well as competition propels evolution. Wolves 
hunt in packs. Birds collectively search for 
food, Bees and ants work together (Kropotkin, 
1989).   
Finally, even if an intervention is 
meritorious and worthy, it may not be 
significant or valuable, i.e. it may not serve the 
public interest, the ultimate survival test in a 
democracy. This may occur when overall 
societal priorities no longer justify the 
intervention design. Equally, in the natural 
world, major changes in the biosphere yield 
intense episodes of species extinction (Raup, 
1994).   
 In sum, in the social world just as in the 
natural world, fitness is a relative and 
contingent concept. No single organism or 
species can be expected to acquire all the 
attributes necessary for survival across all 
possible environmental conditions. 
Specialization and adaptation to an 
environmental niche are imperative. Equally, 
social interventions must be designed to fit 
within a specific operational and political 
context and more than one intervention will 
normally be needed to achieve a pertinent 
societal goal. Inevitably, trade-offs must be 
struck since social needs are diverse, 
resources are limited, and stakeholders’ 
interests vary. The next section seeks to 
demonstrate that the necessary trade-offs are 
better struck with evolutionary evaluation 
than without. 
 
Implications for Evaluation Practice 
 
This section of the paper shifts the focus to the 
evaluand. After examining summative and 
formative evaluation through an evolutionary 
lens, it describes the evaluand’s life cycle. 
Next, it shows how co-evolution and feedback 
ideas as well as natural/artificial selection 
processes help explain the emergence of social 
programs as distinct from social interventions. 
Finally, it explores the implications of 
evolutionary thinking for evaluation at this 
higher plane. 
 
Summative and Formative Evaluation 
 
Evolutionary thinking implies a recognition 
that the social environment is made up of 
complex systems that are continually 
changing in mostly unpredictable ways; that 
social interventions are always experiments, 
and that their adaptation to evolving 
conditions is a condition of their 
sustainability. Hence, social learning depends 
on frequent evaluative feedback informed by 
systems thinking.   
 As part of the blind variation/selective 
retention model of decision making, 
summative evaluation plays a central role. To 
use Popper’s terminology, it aims to refute the 
conjecture embedded in the evaluand. It may 
do so at any stage of the intervention life cycle. 
This conforms to the logic of natural selection: 
eliminating programs that do not work opens 
the way for programs that do.  
On the other hand, even if the theory or the 
intervention has survived rigorous tests, there 
is no guarantee that the problem which the 
intervention has addressed is significant; that 
the intervention is the most relevant, that it 
provides an efficient solution to the problem at 
hand, or that its design will remain serviceable 
in other contexts or in the future. Similarly, in 
the natural world not all species survive the 
multiplicity of threats of diverse and volatile 
environments.  
In other words, empirical testing (does the 
intervention work?) is necessary for sound 
decision making …but it is far from sufficient. 
Even if the conjecture embedded in an 
intervention is not refuted based on valid 
tests, summative evaluation cannot vouch for 
the optimality of the solution. One may help 
the blind man find a hat and confirm that it is 
indeed black…but the hat may not fit the blind 
man’s head, or it may look funny.  
Helping to find a better hat (how to improve 
the intervention) is the province of formative 
evaluation. It is more speculative and open 
ended than summative evaluation. It helps 
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decision makers grope towards better 
targeted, more effective social interventions. It 
draws on dominant social science theories and 
validated meta-evaluation findings, the 
equivalent of inherited structures in biology.  
Its recommendations are only conjectures: the 
past is not necessarily prologue.  
 Thus, evaluation only makes the selective 
retention process somewhat more efficient and 
effective in helping decision makers decide 
whether the intervention is fit for purpose, 
and/or whether the prospects for an even 
closer fit are promising enough to be tried out.  
While evaluation on its own cannot be used to 
justify a social intervention, it can examine it, 
interpret it, confront it, and criticize it to help 
shape judicious decisions regarding its design, 
adaptation, and termination. 
 
Evaluation and the Life Cycle 
 
All social interventions have a finite life – just 
as biological organisms. They evolve through 
different phases of a life cycle. Ontogeny in 
evolution theory describes how an organism is 
born, grows and dies. To thrive within a given 
environment for the duration of its existence, 
the organism draws on innate skills embedded 
in its genetic material as well as on 
behavioural adaptation secured through trial 
and error learning.   
Any social intervention develops in stages. 
The evolutionary perspective encourages 
adaptation of evaluation methods to various 
stages of the intervention life cycle. (Urban, 
Hargraves and Trochim, 2014). During the 
first seminal phase (identification and 
preparation), evaluation offers relevant social 
science findings to shape program design and 
the design of a theory of action that governs 
behaviour through protocols that are akin to 
the content of a genetic mix. Due diligence 
practices follow to help ensure that the 
intervention design is fit for purpose. Here 
again evaluation comes into play through 
small-scale experimental trials followed by 
upscaling tests.  
Next, ex-ante evaluation and evaluability 
assessments help decide whether the 
intervention is worthy of full-scale 
implementation. This is when success 
indicators are identified, and monitoring 
systems are constructed. They mimic the 
feedback mechanisms that help living 
organisms avert danger, locate food, find 
shelter, and survive. They also help the 
intervention adapt through a fine-tuning 
phase when new capabilities are added, skills 
are acquired, routines are firmed up, 
experience is gained, etc.  
This maturation phase is followed by a full-
scale implementation phase which unfolds 
until the intervention objectives are met or 
allocated resources run out. Before they do, 
retrospective evaluation is carried out to 
examine overall performance, draw lessons of 
experience, and where appropriate lay the 
groundwork for a successor intervention, thus 
completing the life cycle. Passing the 
evolutionary torch to the next generation is 
key to long-term sustainability, in the social 
world just as in the natural world. 
 
Feedback and Co-Evolution 
 
Most programs are the offspring of prior 
programs.  Without the right kind of feedback, 
programs fail, as suggested by evolutionary 
theory. Different kinds of feedback can have 
felicitous or disastrous consequences. This is 
because all organisms are part of the 
environment to which they must adapt and as 
they do they may change the environment in 
ways that may threaten their own survival, a 
distinctive feature of Darwinian selection.  
Biological feedback is a two-way street 
(Robertson, 1991). Similarly, social programs 
are intentionally designed to modify the social 
world, but they often do so without adequate 
consideration of their unintended 
consequences, e.g. depletion of environmental 
resources. In such situations, sustainability 
requires the inclusion of projects in existing or 
new programs to mitigate or reverse these 
deleterious effects. Climate change comes to 
mind. 
Co-evolution theory examines how two or 
more organisms evolve together and interact 
symbiotically. Mutualistic relationships 
generate collaborative benefits while parasitic 
and predatory relationships are one-sided and 
fail the test of Pareto optimality.  It follows that 
projects included in program portfolios should 
be subjected to prior co-evolutionary selective 
retention tests.  
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Equally, the evaluation of social programs 
that rely on partnerships to achieve collective 
impact call for performance assessment of 
individual partners to avoid free riding and 
provide incentives for partners to fulfil their 
distinctive accountabilities and respect their 
reciprocal obligations.  
 
Natural and Artificial Selection 
 
Natural selection explains the wide diversity of 
species currently in existence. All living things 
are connected to a common ancestor through 
a huge tree of life. All species are embedded in 
nested hierarchies. As natural events disperse 
organisms of the same species and erect 
barriers between them, organisms must 
struggle to fit different environments and 
cannot interbreed. As a result, over many 
generations, new evolutionary branches 
sprout as the organisms adapt to their 
distinctive ecological niches and accumulate 
different heritable capabilities through natural 
selection.  
Equally, in the social world, different 
program designs evolve to address different 
but interconnected social issues and/or 
respond to diverse stakeholders’ aspirations. 
Several projects are usually needed to address 
a significant social problem. Just as breeders 
select individual plants or animals with 
desirable characteristics to procreate and 
generate the desired breed, policy makers 
resort to programs by selecting and combining 
several interventions to achieve an 
overarching social goal.  
Qualitative comparative analysis using 
Bayesian logic, long applied to the study of 
biological structures, is increasingly used to 
evaluate public policies and programs in 
complex environments (Matthews, 2017). 
Similarly, different types of diagrams display 
logic models in program theory. They show 
how the various project mechanisms fit 
together to make the program work.  They 
evoke the "phylogenetic trees" drawn by 
evolutionary biologists to show the inferred 
relationships among various biological species 
based on similarities and differences in their 
physical or genetic characteristics.  
 
Evaluation of Project Portfolios 
(Programs) 
 
It should be clear by now why variation of 
organisms within a species is essential to 
survival given the diversity of threats that it 
faces and the different environmental 
configurations to which it must adapt. 
Similarly, in the social policy world, resilience 
to risk is enhanced by diversity in program 
content. Evaluation contributes to the 
variation and contributes to the fitness of 
program design through situation analyses 
and evaluability assessments.  
Phylogeny is the scientific study of how 
species (collections of organisms) evolve. It 
also throws light on the genesis of social 
programs made up of a portfolio of project 
interventions. For example, evaluation helps 
to construct programs through a process akin 
to selective breeding: a program is typically 
made up of several projects designed and 
chosen to tap synergies and/or adapt program 
characteristics to local conditions (Trochim, 
2007). Programs come into being through 
blind variation and selective retention, just as 
individual interventions. 
Evaluation of project portfolios starts with 
an aggregation of separate project level 
evaluations used as building blocks for the 
overall program evaluation edifice. But 
programs, just as individual projects, are 
knowledge organisms so that their evaluation 
also calls for a generic theory of action and 
change that takes explicit account of project 
interlinkages and interactions, i.e., their 
alignment and coherence towards desired 
program goals. How do evolutionary processes 
at the intervention level affect changes at the 
program level? This is best explained by a 
hierarchical cycle of positive and negative 
feedback, resource allocations imposed by 
program management and artificial 
selection/retention of projects to achieve 
synergies (Van de Ven and Grazman, 1999).    
 Similarly, evaluation networks and 
practices can be conceived as a complex 
knowledge organism made up of diverse 
evaluation approaches and methods that co-
exist and interact. Arguably, their co-evolution 
reflects the same blind variation and selective 
retention mechanisms that govern other 
knowledge occupations. Not all monitoring 
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and evaluation models survive, e.g. adversary 
evaluation and management by objectives are 
no longer around. What then lies ahead for 
evaluation? Evidently, it is now time to turn to 





In this section, I outline Campbell’s 
Experimenting Society; acknowledge 
Campbell’s deep ambivalence about it; identify 
the antecedents of an on-going international 
development experimentalist initiative; show 
how its advent fits within the evolutionary 
path of the discipline and offer an admittedly 
tentative, fallible, and corrigible assessment of 
its record so far.  
  
What is the Experimenting Society? 
 
According to Carol Weiss (2000), the 
Experimenting Society reflects Campbell’s 
interest in strengthening the role of reason 
and logic in politics. But as a firm adherent of 
Popper’s Open Society ideas, Campbell 
believed in participatory democracy and did 
not advocate technocracy nor an elite status 
for evaluators.  Nor did he condone evaluators’ 
pretensions to shape policy, except indirectly 
through the assessment of current and past 
policies. He restricted the remit of evaluation 
to ascertaining whether programs “work” – as 
only one element of public deliberation and 
multiparty negotiations.  
The ideology of the Experimenting Society 
is admirable. Who can object to “a popularly 
responsive society whose goals and means are 
determined by collective good and popular 
preference…an honest society committed to 
reality testing, to self-criticism, to avoiding 
self-deception”, or to “an accountable, 
challengeable due process society … 
decentralized in all feasible aspects … (with) 
means idealism as well as ends idealism” 
(Kelly & Gregware, 1998, p. 190)?   
In this connection Campbell visualized two 
sets of problems. The first had to do with “the 
widespread resistance of institutions and 
administrators to have their programs 
evaluated… as we try to implement high 
quality program evaluations we meet with 
continual frustration from the political 
system. It seems at times to set up just to 
prevent reality testing” (Campbell, 1988, p. 
36). To address it, he called on evaluators “to 
make a career commitment…to contribute to 
the best possible exploration – in advance of 
what such (an experimenting) society would be 
like” (Campbell, 1988, 37) ...and “to invent 
political/organizational alternatives that 
would avoid the problem” (Campbell, 1988, p. 
47) 
This manoeuvre allowed him to avoid 
tackling the problem directly and to side step 
the dilemmas associated with multi-
objectives, ambiguous, evolving, adaptable 
social programs, let alone the diverse, 
conflicting, and sometimes self-serving and 
covert goals of sponsors and/or funders. Nor 
did Campbell delve into how evaluation should 
relate to organizations or address how 
evaluators might protect their independence 
in a market driven occupation. Instead, he 
concentrated on a second set of problems 
having to do with evaluation methods and 
processes.  
He presumably did so for pragmatic 
reasons: these are matters that the evaluation 
community has the wherewithal to address. 
Thus, he put forward a wide range of sensible 
albeit modest proposals to facilitate evaluation 
use – emphasizing evaluation of successful 
programs; using volunteers in randomized 
experiments; complying with strict 
transparency rules regarding funding and 
data collection; eschewing the use of simplistic 
indicators in program management; 
respecting the people involved in and 
benefiting from programs; etc. 
Throughout his exploration of evaluation 
methods and practices, he was explicit 
regarding the essential criteria of validity, 
interpretability, and reliability and he never 
questioned the primacy of experimentalism. In 
fact, he made clear that his central concern 
was “to extend the epistemology of the 
experimental method into nonlaboratory 
social science… (and) to treat “the ameliorative 
effects of government as field experiments 




Revealingly, Campbell withheld the 
publication of “The Experimenting Society” 
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that he had crafted in 1971 until the 
compilation of a selection of his papers in 
Overman (1988). His unease about prescribing 
a utopian vision for evaluation in society is 
unsurprising: he considered any idea of 
clairvoyance to be fatuous (Campbell, 1966) 
and he disdained social scientists who are 
trapped by their theories, do not subject them 
to reality testing and feel free to “say what is 
to be done… rather (than) to say what has 
been done” (Campbell, 1988, pp. 44-45).       
Unsurprisingly, Campbell faced vigorous 
opposition when he presented his ideas to 
various disputatious communities of “truth 
seekers”. They pointed to several practical, 
political, theoretical, and ethical issues that 
Campbell had not addressed convincingly 
(Shaver & Staines, 1971). This helps explain 
why Campbell conceived of the Experimenting 
Society as only one among many alternative 
utopias. He acknowledged that once the full 
implications of information overload implicit in 
the proposed Experimenting Society, “this 
monster of measurement”, might well be 
rejected out of hand. 
 
Experimentalism in Development: The 
Antecedents 
 
Campbell’s Experimenting Society could not 
have been conceived today. It was created at a 
time of optimism about public affairs. 
Published a year before the Berlin wall 
crumbled, it made assumptions about politics 
and the society that are no longer valid (Kelly 
& Gregware, 1998). Specifically, it was shaped 
by the confluence of two waves of evaluation 
diffusion (Vedung, 2010). First, the 
experimental wave of the 1950s and 1960s, a 
radically rationalist, positivist, and 
meritocratic phase of evaluation history 
grounded in quantitative methods that he was 
instrumental in triggering. Next, the dialogic 
wave which swelled in the late 1960’s and 
prevailed until the mid-1980s: the heyday of 
qualitative methods and participatory 
processes geared to social learning and 
community empowerment.  
But by the time the Experimenting Society 
paper was published a neo-liberal wave had 
engulfed the evaluation discipline. Suddenly 
government was perceived as the problem 
rather than the solution. This is when the new 
public management movement, emphasizing 
devolution, decentralization, and 
deregulation, introduced market thinking into 
government. The next wave was evidence-
based and it too was powerfully influenced by 
Campbell’s ideas. Its prime movers sought a 
sharper edge in evaluation methods that 
would produce incontrovertible evidence of 
verifiable “results” as justification for public 
action.  
 
The International Development 
Experimentalist Initiative 
 
The onslaught on qualitative development 
evaluation occurred at the turn of the century. 
These results differed from those of a cottage 
industry of policy research studies that could 
not identify robust correlations between aid 
volumes and economic growth. Their 
ambiguous findings, due to the 
methodological limitations of cross-country 
correlations, amplified development aid 
pessimism within an environment of budget 
austerity in donor countries. 
This new context created a strategic 
opportunity for young economists based at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). 
Its Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) charismatic co-
founder famously declared during a World 
Bank Conference in 2003: “Just as 
randomised evaluations revolutionized 
medicine in the 20th century, they have the 
potential to revolutionize social policy during 
the 21st” (Duflo and Kremer, 2005).  
 
Is Randomization the Answer? 
 
In the right circumstances experimental 
methods do establish causality by providing a 
valid measure of the counterfactual. They 
successfully address the issue of selection bias 
and allow evaluators to establish a measure of 
statistical significance to evaluation findings. 
These are formidable advantages. On the other 
hand, randomization is mostly suited to 
simple, tunnel-type interventions with easily 
identified participants and non-participants, 
where spillover effects are not likely to bias the 
results. Yet, this is where knowledge gaps are 
the deepest.   
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Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are 
redundant when no other plausible 
explanation for the results observed is 
available. They are not always feasible, for 
example when no untreated target group can 
be identified or when an intervention or policy 
is intended to be universal. They may not even 
be decisive in establishing attribution, for 
example where latent and unobserved causal 
factors affect the experiment.  They are utterly 
unsuitable for the evaluation of complicated or 
complex programs in unstable environments 
that characterize most development 
situations.  
Nor is external validity, a pre-requisite of 
development policy relevance, their forte. The 
notion of a universal data base that would 
provide valid answers to what works and does 
not work in international development was 
termed ‘crazy’ by a former World Bank Chief 
Economist (Bedecarrats, Guerin & Roubaud, 
2017, p.11) and it would probably have been 
dismissed out of hand by Campbell as an 
example of the misplaced assurance of 
scholars “quite out keeping with the scientific 
status of their fields” (Campbell, 1998, p. 45).    
 RCTs raise complex ethical issues, involve 
high costs, require superior skills, large 
samples, and specialized quality assurance 
arrangements. They inhibit resort to cheaper 
and more effective evaluations. They also 
hinder fulsome participation of beneficiaries in 
the evaluation process. Finally, they privilege 
the selection of simplistic programs and 
projects that may not be fit for purpose. Most 
high-level policies, programs and projects that 
are now privileged by international 
development agencies are not evaluable 
through randomized treatment.  
 These propositions are amply confirmed by 
the travails of four RCT driven studies carried 
out in Mexico, Cambodia, and Kenya 
(Bedecarrats, Guerin & Roubaud, 2017, 
pp.11-16). There are better alternatives. Mixed 
methods guided by theories of change and 
backed up as appropriate by quasi-
experimental methods pioneered by Campbell 
are better equipped to assess goal relevance 
and determine the reasons for success or 
failure of achieving intended effects (and the 
extent and nature of unintended effects). They 
help to distinguish design issues and 
implementation problems. They can be shaped 
by the questions of interest to stakeholders 
and the assumptions embedded in program 





Campbell’s evolutionary epistemology 
provides a robust intellectual framework for 
probing knowledge creation, social learning, 
and evaluation. Blind variation and selective 
retention illuminate the unique remit of the 
evaluation discipline, its criteria, and its 
mechanisms. The parallels between natural 
and artificial selection and the metaphors 
associated with ontogeny, phylogeny, 
biological co-evolution, positive and negative 
feedbacks, nested hierarchies, etc. are 
instructive. 
Thus, biological evolution theory helps to 
adapt evaluation methods to various phases of 
social intervention life cycles, provokes useful 
reflections about complexity theory in 
evaluation, and generates helpful guidance 
towards the assessment of program theories, 
the evaluation of project portfolios and the 
design of social partnerships.  
Finally, an evolutionary perspective on the 
advent of an experimentalist initiative in 
international development suggests that 
Campbell’s utopian vision of an Experimenting 
Society came into being on an international 
stage because it happened to fit the 
contemporary neo-liberal, evidence-based 
public policy climate and because it was 
funded and controlled by aid donors and 
wealthy private foundations for 
implementation in the zones of conflict and 
turbulence of the developing world rather than 
in the industrial democracies, i.e., without 
need for deep public involvement and support.   
Based on available evidence, the serious 
reservations that Campbell’s tentative 
proposals for an Experimenting Society had 
evinced within the evaluation community 
when it was unveiled have been validated.  
Wisely, Campbell had suspended his advocacy 
of the Experimenting Society pending reality 
testing and he stressed that “we should 
anticipate its dangers and misuse as well as 
its promises…and that we should keep open 
the possibility that we will end up opposing it”.  
Notwithstanding the recent awarding of 
the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic 
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Sciences to three pioneers of randomized 
control trials, the disappointing results of the 
development experimentalist initiative as 
applied so far suggest that, from an 
evolutionary perspective, it would be judicious 
to revise the approach and adopt mixed 
methods (Stern et. al., 2012) while continuing 
to celebrate Campbell’s extraordinary and 
inspiring intellectual achievements in the 
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